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The title of today’s conference—International Law in the Age of 
Trump—reminds us that we have entered a period in which many 
things, big and small, are being re-examined, and this re-examination 
is being shaped by forces that we do not fully understand.  
There are questions on the domestic stage about how our political 
system will operate into the future, and the values and priorities of 
the American people to which it will respond. But the questions on 
the international stage are just as profound: questions about the basic 
institutions of our international architecture, including the role of the 
United Nations, the future of the North Atlantic Alliance, the 
principles of free trade, and the importance of international law and 
other international norms. There are strong interests in the stability, 
predictability, and reliability that the existing institutions and rules 
have been intended to provide.     
Questions about the rules governing the use of force are part of 
this broader debate about the post-World War II architecture.  It is 
thus in the context of this broader debate that we should consider 
these rules should operate in connection with so-called “rogue states” 
and, inevitably, about whether we should be working to loosen these 
rules.1   
 
* Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, 
DC. Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University Law 
School. Formerly Ambassador and Special Coordinator for Global 
Criminal Justice, U.S. Department of State; and Assistant Legal Adviser 
for United Nations Affairs, and Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-
Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State. This essay is adopted from a 
presentation prepared for the Frederick K. Cox International Law 
Center Conference, “International Law and Policy in the Age of 
Trump,” at Case Western Reserve University School of Law on 
September 14, 2018. 
1. The basic rules under the UN Charter are familiar to international 
lawyers. States have a basic obligation under Article 2(4) for states to 
refrain from the threat or use of force. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
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In principle, there would seem to be a strong interest in not 
contributing to a breaking down of basic paradigms that are central 
to the international architecture, and not fueling a sense that 
international institutions generally are ripe for rejection.  Beyond 
questions about the desirability of not contributing generally to 
paradigm breaking, there are questions about whether we find 
ourselves in an opportune political environment in which to 
affirmatively articulate new criteria or standards for resort to force 
that would be needed to replace the old. How, in this environment, 
would the new rules be crafted? Would they be sufficiently cabined so 
as to protect against over-emphasis on short-term advantages to the 
detriment of our genuine long-term interests? Change, even of bad 
rules, is not inherently desirable, but rather depends on what rules, or 
lack of rules, would replace them.   
I say this not to argue against the desirability of encouraging 
changes in the rules as such, but only to strike a note of caution 
about the need to think carefully before doing so. The existence of 
risk is only one part of what needs to be considered, and one cannot 
determine whether the risk is worth taking without also considering 
the potential benefits. To evaluate the potential benefits of new rules, 
we need to consider the extent to which the existing rules are in fact 
constraining us from actions against rogue states that we would 
otherwise want to undertake.  And it also requires a clear 
understanding of what we mean when we refer to rogue states. 
What rogue states do we have in mind?  
The phrase “rogue state” is not defined under international law 
and there is no clear consensus about what it means.2 Different 
administrations have had different ideas about the criteria for 
qualification as a rogue state and which states meet the criteria.3   
There is an exception recognized under Article 51 for states to exercise 
their “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed 
attack occurs”; and there is an exception for situations in which the 
Security Council authorizes the use of force. U.N. Charter art. 51. It is 
also recognized that states can generally deploy and use military force 
within a state if they have the consent of the government of that host 
state, though this can be conceptualized as not constituting a use of 
force within the meaning of Article 2(4). 
2. See ROBERT S. LITWAK, OUTLIER STATES: AMERICAN STRATEGIES TO 
CHANGE, CONTAIN, OR ENGAGE REGIMES 11 (2012) (“‘[r]ogue state’ was 
a unilateral American political concept, without foundation in 
international law”); Paul F. Diehl & Tom Ginsburg, Essay: Irrational 
War and Constitutional Design: A Reply to Professors Nzelibe and Yoo, 
27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1239, 1256 (2006) (discussing different approaches 
to defining “rogue state”). 
3. See LITWAK, supra note 2, at 9-19 (discussing evolution of policy 
towards such states). 
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Lawyers sometimes refer to lists that exist under various pieces of 
domestic legislation, such as the list of terrorism-supporting states 
under United States foreign assistance and export control laws4 or the 
list of so-called “pariah states” that are the subject of special rules 
requiring proportionate withholdings when calculating United States 
contributions to international organizations.5 Others outside the U.S. 
government have had their own views, such as the characterization by 
the President of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former 
Yugoslavia of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Milosevic as a 
rogue state.6  
For its part, the Clinton administration used this phrase to 
include Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, and sometimes Cuba.7  
Then-National Security Adviser Anthony Lake described them as 
“recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside 
the family but also assault its basic values.”8 He described 
characteristics that he said they shared:—rule by cliques that control 
power through coercion, suppression of human rights, promotion of 
radical ideologies, antipathy toward popular participation that might 
undermine the regime, and a chronic inability to engage 
constructively with the rest of the world.9    
The Clinton administration eventually found that the use of the 
phrase complicated foreign policymaking and made a conscious 
decision to stop using it.10 However it was again used by the Bush 
administration, notably in connection with the phrase “axis of evil,” 
which was often seen as tied to interests in regime change.11 What did  
4. 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (2008); 22 U.S.C. § 2780 (2014); 50 U.S.C. § 4813 
(2018). 
5. 22 U.S.C. § 2227 (2007). 
6. Marlise Simons, Hague Journal; Then It Was the Klan. Now It’s the 
Balkans Agony, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 1999), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/13/world/hague-journal-then-it-was-
the-klan-now-it-s-the-balkan-agony.html [https://perma.cc/LV7T-
GY9W].    
7. See Christopher Marquis, U.S. Declares ‘Rogue Nations’ Are Now 
‘States of Concern,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2000), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/20/world/us-declares-rogue-nations-
are-now-states-of-concern.html [https://perma.cc/4RT8-YHTG] (“The 
term [rogue nations] is often applied to the seven countries listed by 
State Department as sponsoring terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
North Korea, Sudan and Syria.”). 
8. Anthony Lake, Confronting Backlash States, 73 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 45, 45 
(1994). 
9. Id. at 46. 
10. Marquis, supra note 7. 
11. Richard N. Haass, Regime Change and Its Limits, 84 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
66 (2005). 
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rogue states have in common? According to National Security Adviser 
Lake— 
“they are embarked on ambitious and costly military programs-
especially in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile 
delivery systems-in a misguided quest for a great equalizer to 
protect their regimes or advance their purposes abroad.”12 
In President Bush’s words— 
“States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of 
evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.  By seeking 
weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and 
growing danger.  They could provide these arms to terrorists, 
giving them the means to match their hatred.  They could 
attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States.  In 
any of these cases, the price of indifference would be 
catastrophic.”13 
Statements like these strongly suggest that “rogue-ness” was 
conceptualized in terms of states that pose security threats.  It is true 
that President Bush also said that the attributes of these countries 
included brutalization of their own people and disregard of 
international law,14 and National Security Adviser Lake described the 
propensity to suppress human rights as a characteristic these 
countries shared.15 But the fact that the remedies they proposed for 
dealing with these states were security measures—proactive and 
strengthened counter-proliferation and non-proliferation efforts,16 and 
active engagement “in unilateral and multilateral efforts to restrict 
their military and technological capabilities”17—left little doubt that 
the heart of the problem was seen as a security threat. As rogue 
status had become increasingly associated with talk of regime change, 
the Obama administration moved away from the nomenclature,18 but 
 
12. Lake, supra note 8, at 46. 
13. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (29 January 




15. Lake, supra note 8, at 46. 
16. U.S. National Security Strategy: Prevent Our Enemies From 
Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June 1, 2002), https://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15425.htm[https://perma.cc/HC7S-Y2QJ]. 
17. Lake, supra note 8, at 46. 
18. Robert S. Litwak, From “Rogues” to “Outliers”: Can Iran and North 
Korea Change their Behavior Absent a Change in the Character of their 
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the Trump administration has more recently returned to it, with 
President Trump adding Venezuela to the group in his first address as 
President to the United Nations General Assembly.19  
Thus, the main categories of rogue states are what might be 
called “security rogues,” but it is also possible to include a second 
category of “human rights rogues.”  There is significant room for 
debate regarding how particular human rights abusers would be 
selected for inclusion in any list of human rights rogues. One obvious 
possibility would be to include states that—in the words of the 
Responsibility to Protect principles adopted by heads of state and 
government at the United Nations in 2005—are “manifestly failing to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity.”20   
Use of Force Law and the Different Kinds of Threats 
Posed by Different Kinds of Rogues.  
Use of force law has evolved very differently with respect to the 
kinds of threats posed by the two categories of rogue states. Indeed, 
there has in fact been significant evolution since World War II in 
views about the rules governing the use of force in the absence of 
authorization from the Security Council, but that evolution has 
occurred within a basic architecture the is centered on self-defense. 
The great bulk of that evolution has thus occurred in the context of 
the kinds of threats posed by “security rogues” rather than “human 
rights rogues.”  
(a) Security Rogues.  
With relatively few exceptions, when acting without Security 
Council authorization, the U.S. and other states continue to explain 
their resorts to military force in self-defense terms, even as their 
understanding and interpretation of what qualifies as self-defense has 
evolved with changes in the security environment in which states find 
themselves.  In essence, the U.S. and others have found ways to shape 
the essential constructs of self-defense under the UN Charter regime 
 
Regimes?, THE GLOBALIST (May 4, 2010), 
https://www.theglobalist.com/from-rogues-to-
outliers/[https://perma.cc/KR6A-TGZQ]. 
19. President Donald Trump, Remarks to the 72nd Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly (Sept. 19, 2017), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly/ 
[https://perma.cc/2TPK-TXSF]. The evolution of policy towards such 
states is discussed in considerable depth in LITWAK, supra note 2. 
20. G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138-39 (Oct. 24, 
2005). 
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to justify use of force in cases where they believe it is essential for 
security reasons.  
For example, The United Nations Charter itself talks about use of 
force in self-defense only in the event of an “armed attack” against a 
state. Yet, for many years, the position of the United States has been 
that force can permissibly be used to protect its nationals where a 
host state fails to do so. This is reflected, for instance, in the 
justification provided by the United States for the mission to rescue 
the Embassy hostages from Tehran in 198021 or, to give a non-U.S. 
example, the Israeli raid on Entebbe in 1976.22 Had there been in 
either case an “armed attack” against a state?  Perhaps not in the 
way that people would have traditionally understood that phrase, and 
there were certainly doubts expressed at the time that the misconduct 
qualified as an “armed attack;”23 but the situation presented 
sufficiently compelling security interests to warrant the result and the 
letter that the United States submitted to the Security Council under 
Article 51 specifically referred to the “American nationals who have 
been and remain the victims of the Iranian armed attack on our 
Embassy.”24  
The Charter also contains no specific words about using force 
against states that are “unable or unwilling” to prevent their territory 
from being used as a base for attacks, yet the United States has 
developed and used the argument that the author of the attack need 
not be the state on whose territory force is used in self-defense. As an 
example, we see this interpretation in connection with the U.S. attack 
on Sudan in 1998 after the al-Qa’ida bombing of the U.S. Embassies 
in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, following what the United States 
 
21. Letter From the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/13908 (Apr. 25 1980), available at 
https://undocs.org/en/s/13908 [https://perma.cc/C5HD-L85Y]. 
22. Id. at 286. Letter From the Permanent Representative of Israel to the 
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/12123 
(July 4, 1976), available at https://undocs.org/en/s/12123 
[https://perma.cc/SZT5-VAYK]. 
23. See, e.g., Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Supplement 
1975-1980, Chapter VIII, Consideration of Questions under the Council’s 
Responsibility for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 
at 176, 289, available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/75-80/75-
80_08.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU88-M38A] (objections raised by various 
states that the Israeli military operation in Uganda violated the UN 
Charter because Israel had not been a victim of an armed attack by 
Uganda). 
24. Letter From the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America, supra note 25 (emphasis added).  
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described as efforts to convince the Sudanese government to shut 
down al-Qaida’s activities.25  
A third example comes from the treatment of intermittent attacks 
over a prolonged period of time, where some might argue that no one 
strike reaches the threshold of an armed attack, or that a defensive 
use of force was not proportional to the particular attack that 
preceded it.  For its part, the United States has made clear that it 
does not accept these arguments.26 In practical terms, it would be 
untenable, it has been felt, to require that a response must be 
calibrated to a particular intermittent attack and thus unable to 
respond to the threat as a whole.27 Again, the theory is not beyond 
doubt, but the legal justification is framed so as to fit within the 
existing international law architecture that governs use of force in 
self-defense.28   
Finally, perhaps the most important example in relation to 
security rogues involves anticipatory self-defense. Can force be used in 
self-defense only, in the words of Article 51 of the Charter, “if an 
armed attack occurs,”29 or can it also be used if an attack is 
imminent?  For its part, the U.S. position has been the latter, and it 
has argued that the test for imminence must be applied in the context 
of the evolving security environment in which the international 
community has come to find itself.30  The expansion of the concept of  
25. Letter From the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, S/1998/780 (Aug. 20 1998), available at 
https://undocs.org/en/s/1998/780 [https://perma.cc/QYE2-7BHE]. For 
a discussion on the air strikes following the Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam 
attacks, see Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes 
Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 559 (1999). 
26. William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 
YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 305-6 (2004). 
27. Id.  
28. Id. at 305 (“A proper assessment of the proportionality of a defensive 
use of force would require looking not only at the immediately preceding 
armed attack, but also at whether it was part of an ongoing series of 
attacks, what steps were already taken to deter future attacks, and what 
force could reasonably be judged to be needed to successfully deter 
future attacks.”) (citations omitted). 
29. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
30. See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RH7M-9M2A] (“We must adapt the concept of 
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s 
adversaries…The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction— 
and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to 
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of 
the enemy’s attack.”). 
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imminence was fueled by fears of the toxic combination of terrorists 
and weapons of mass destruction,31 but the important point for 
purposes of this discussion is that the legal argumentation is framed 
to fit within the idea of use of force in self-defense. 
To be sure, the international community does not uniformly 
accept the principles described above.  Indeed, perfectly plausible 
arguments can and have been made that the international 
community, through adoption of the UN Charter, has agreed that 
decisions to use force have been reserved to the Security Council to 
deal with such situations.  But all of these examples involve situations 
in which states—at least states that would have the capabilities to 
protect themselves—will simply not defer and await the vagaries of 
action by the Security Council, at least in a world in which they see 
the Security Council as incapable of dealing with such threats 
effectively. Such states have enough confidence in the principles, and 
view the principles as so tied to interests they consider vital, that the 
absence of consensus does little to dissuade their reliance on them, 
and their potential for blowback from other states is not sufficient to 
offset the perceived imperative for action.  
(b) Human Rights Rogues.  
Things have evolved differently regarding the kinds of threats 
posed by human rights rogues. There has in fact been extensive 
evolution in the understanding that human rights abusers can pose a 
threat to international peace and security. Indeed, that understanding 
has been the legal predicate for the vast expansion over time in the 
Security Council’s use of its authority under chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, and indeed was the predicate for the adoption of the 
Responsibility to Protect principles adopted at the United Nations in 
2005.32  In addition, there has been greater acceptance over time of 
steps short of force that are aimed at promoting human rights as not 
being prohibited by the principle of non-intervention.33   
 
31. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility: Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
32. Id. at ¶ 200 (“The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs 
cannot be used to protect genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as 
large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale 
ethnic cleansing, which can properly be considered a threat to 
international security and as such provoke action by the Security 
Council.”). 
33. See, e.g., Maziar Jamnejad & Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-
Intervention, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 345, 381 (2009) (referring to the 
principle of non-intervention as an “essentially relative concept” that 
has been “profoundly affected by the development of international 
human rights law and globalization, and arguably also by widespread 
acceptance of the importance for international relations of such 
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But we have not seen nearly the same evolution regarding resort 
to armed force against human rights abusers not authorized by the 
Security Council. Why not?  Is it simply not possible to construct 
plausible legal arguments to support such an evolution? That seems 
doubtful—or, at least, a less than complete explanation—and, in fact, 
a small handful of states have put forward legal arguments.34  There 
are any number of ways such arguments might be constructed, 
including, for example, based on: 
● principles of necessity;  
● the limiting effect of the phrase “against the territorial 
integrity or political independence” in Article 2(4) on the scope 
of the obligation to refrain from the use of force; 
● the notion that rights to use force that preceded the Charter 
are “revived” where the Security Council is sufficiently 
dysfunctional that it is failing to carry out the kind of use of 
force decision-making that was the predicate for states agreeing 
to the Charter’s limitations on use of force;  
● the notion that the Charter was specifically designed to 
“promot[e] and encourage respect for human rights;”   
● the idea of a moral order that preempts an otherwise 
inconsistent legal rule to the extent necessary to protect 
innocent civilians from being slaughtered.  
Is there something else about use of force to stop human rights 
abuses that accounts for the difference? It is sometimes suggested that 
the human rights interests protected by such uses of force are not 
typically particular to the intervener, but rather are interests that are 
common to the international community as a whole, and that 
therefore any particular country or countries—as opposed to the 
mechanisms that the international community has established to 
protect its common interests, most notably the Security Council— 
 
principles as democracy, good governance, and the rule of law.”); Lori 
Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and 
Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 
(1989) (noting states’ increased toleration and indeed encouragement of 
trans-boundary political activities, and treatment of such activities as 
not constituting violations of international law prohibitions on non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other states). 
34. See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Use By Syrian Regime: UK Government 
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should not be allowed to “make the call” on whether to resort to force 
for humanitarian intervention purposes.35  
It may well be true that the threats posed by human rights rogues 
are not particular to any group of states, but is that not also true of 
the threats posed by security rogues? Do such security threats 
similarly fall on the international community as a whole?  That may 
be true in the abstract, but leaders of strong states may well perceive 
the threat from security rogues as directed in particular against them 
and may well perceive a special responsibility for protecting against 
the kind of security threats they present. Leaders may thus see less of 
a direct vital interest in international law being molded in a way that 
permits them to take on particular responsibility for a humanitarian 
burden, and may additionally fear that that permission will too 
quickly evolve into an obligation.  We thus should not be blind to the 
possibility that herein rests the underlying reason that there has been 
less evolution in the rules on use of force for humanitarian purposes 
than in the rules regarding self-defense.  
That is not to say that there are not situations in which 
humanitarian considerations play an important role in U.S. decisions 
about resort to force. But at least arguably, in each case, there is an 
essential security context.  In Kosovo, for example, which many 
people recall today in humanitarian intervention terms, the Clinton 
administration’s justification for military action was laced with 
security considerations, and the narrative often began by recalling the 
circumstances of the start of World War I in the Balkans.36 And even 
something like the recent April 14, 2018, airstrikes in response to use 
of chemical weapons in Syria involved active hostilities in a theater in 
which U.S. military personnel were already operating;37 and it is 
certainly not hard to conceptualize the underlying threat as based on 
special security concerns regarding “breaking the seal” on proliferation 
 
35. See Franklin Berman, The UN Charter and the Use of Force, 10 Sɪɴɢ. 
Y.B. OF Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 9 (2006). 
36. See, e.g., Daily Press Briefing, State Department (23 March 1999), 
available at http://www.hri.org/news/usa/std/1999/99-03-23.std.html 
[https://perma.cc/YQ6E-4VMT] (“Serbia’s actions constitute a threat 
to the region, particularly Albania and Macedonia and potentially 
NATO allies Greece and Turkey”); Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of 
State, Remarks and Q&A Session at The Brookings Institution National 
Issues Forum: A New NATO for a New Century (Apr. 6, 1999) 
(“Kosovo is part of an area, the southeast corner of Europe, where 
World War I began” (emphasis added), available at https://1997-
2001.state.gov/statements/1999/990406.html[https://perma.cc/F88V-
JY6D]. 
37. Helene Cooper & Ben Hubbard, Pentagon Says Syria Strikes Hit ‘Heart’ 
of Chemical Weapons Program, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/world/middleeast/syria-
airstrikes-analysis.html[https://perma.cc/3YJ3-BUGN]. 
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and use of weapons of mass destruction, and as a threat that falls 
with particular force on the United States and its allies.  Indeed, it is 
worth noting that the April 14 airstrikes were directed against Syrian 
chemical weapons facilities,38 notwithstanding other actions that could 
have been taken to provide more protection for a greater number of 
civilians if the action were driven solely, or even predominantly, by a 
desire to protect civilians. If the objectives were predominantly 
humanitarian, there would have been better ways to get greater 
humanitarian bang for the buck. 
Concluding Observations.   
There is thus a distinct possibility that the absence of a 
humanitarian intervention doctrine results more from the absence of 
political will than from an inability to craft plausible legal arguments.  
Policymakers do not push for legal theories to make permissible 
things that they do not particularly want to do, and their lawyers do 
not reach for theories for which policymakers do not push.  
In light of this, there are at least two things worth considering for 
those who would want to encourage a greater willingness to use force 
in the face of humanitarian catastrophes. First, on a case-by-case 
basis, proponents of such uses of force may want to work to develop 
legal arguments that are tailored in a fact-specific manner to 
particular situations, that express the humanitarian goals of a 
particular mission in terms that resonate from a security perspective, 
and that better fit into the pattern of arguments that have been used 
to justify use of force for self-defense. This may not be as hard as it 
seems at first blush as it may well be that any cases that entail a 
realistic prospect of U.S. military intervention will (like Kosovo) be 
laced with security considerations.  Second, on a more general level, 
proponents of such uses of force may want to work to develop a more 
compelling narrative about the security threats that humanitarian 
catastrophes do in fact pose. There is certainly a strong case that can 
be made that the United States has a profound security interest in 
atrocity prevention, even if the risk posed by such atrocities does not 
fall on the United States alone. The premise that we have such a 
security interest is of course a cornerstone of President Obama’s 
Presidential Security Directive 10, which stated that preventing mass 
atrocities is a “core national security interest, and not just a moral 
 
38. Phil Stewart & Tom Perry, U.S. Says Air Strikes Cripple Syria 
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responsibility,”39 and established an Atrocity Prevention Board which 
has been embraced in bipartisan legislation that President Trump 
signed into law in January 2019.40 All of that is good, but it may be 
that policymakers have said the words but not yet fully absorbed 
their own message. 
 
 
39. Barack Obama, Presidential Security Directive/PSD10, Presidential 
Security Directive on Mass Atrocities (4 August 2011). See also 
MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT & WILLIAM S. COHEN, PREVENTING GENOCIDE: 
A BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS (2008), at xx (discussing ways in 
which genocide and mass atrocities threaten core U.S. national 
interests), available at https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20081124-
genocide-prevention-report.pdf. 
40. Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, Pub. L. 
No.115-441 (Jan. 14, 2019), 132. Stat. 5586. Among other things, this 
legislation provides that it shall be the policy of the United States to 
“regard the prevention of atrocities as in its national interest.” Id., 
section 3(1). 
